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Autor: Antimulticulture@somewhere.com (2004-04-06 00:29:50)
COMBATING TERRORISM
An Essential War
Ousting Saddam was the only option.
http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110004882
BY GEORGE P. SHULTZ
Monday, March 29, 2004 12:01 a.m. EST
We have struggled with terrorism for a long time. In the Reagan
administration, I was a hawk on the subject. I said terrorism is a big
problem, a different problem, and we have to take forceful action against
it. Fortunately, Ronald Reagan agreed with me, but not many others did. (Don
Rumsfeld was an outspoken exception.)
In those days we focused on how to defend against terrorism. We reinforced
our embassies and increased our intelligence effort. We thought we made some
progress. We established the legal basis for holding states responsible for
using terrorists to attack Americans anywhere. Through intelligence, we did
abort many potential terrorist acts. But we didnt really understand what
motivated the terrorists or what they were out to do.
In the 1990s, the problem began to appear even more menacing. Osama bin
Laden and al Qaeda were well known, but the nature of the terrorist threat
was not yet comprehended and our efforts to combat it were ineffective.
Diplomacy without much force was tried. Terrorism was regarded as a law
enforcement problem and terrorists as criminals. Some were arrested and put
on trial. Early last year, a judge finally allowed the verdict to stand for
one of those convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing. Ten years!
Terrorism is not a matter that can be left to law enforcement, with its
deliberative process, built-in delays, and safeguards that may let the
prisoner go free on procedural grounds.
Today, looking back on the past quarter century of terrorism, we can see
that it is the method of choice of an extensive, internationally connected
ideological movement dedicated to the destruction of our international
system of cooperation and progress. We can see that the 1981 assassination
of President Anwar Sadat, the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, the
2001 destruction of the Twin Towers, the bombs on the trains in Madrid, and
scores of other terrorist attacks in between and in many countries, were
carried out by one part or another of this movement. And the movement is
connected to states that develop awesome weaponry, with some of it, or with
expertise, for sale.
What should we do? First and foremost, shore up the state system.
The world has worked for three centuries with the sovereign state as the
basic operating entity, presumably accountable to its citizens and
responsible for their well-being. In this system, states also interact with
each other--bilaterally or multilaterally--to accomplish ends that transcend
their borders. They create international organizations to serve their ends,
not govern them.
Increasingly, the state system has been eroding. Terrorists have exploited
this weakness by burrowing into the state system in order to attack it.
While the state system weakens, no replacement is in sight that can perform
the essential functions of establishing an orderly and lawful society,
protecting essential freedoms, providing a framework for fruitful economic
activity, contributing to effective international cooperation, and providing
for the common defense.
I see our great task as restoring the vitality of the state system within
the framework of a world of opportunity, and with aspirations for a world of
states that recognize accountability for human freedom and dignity.
All established states should stand up to their responsibilities in the
fight against our common enemy, terror; be a helpful partner in economic and
political development; and take care that international organizations work
for their member states, not the other way around. When they do, they
deserve respect and help to make them work successfully.
The civilized world has a common stake in defeating the terrorists. We now
call this what it is: a War on Terrorism. In war, you have to act on both
offense and defense. You have to hit the enemy before the enemy hits you.
The diplomacy of incentives, containment, deterrence and prevention are all
made more effective by the demonstrated possibility of forceful pre-emption.
Strength and diplomacy go together. They are not alternatives; they are
complements. You work diplomacy and strength together on a grand and
strategic scale and on an operational and tactical level. But if you deny
yourself the option of forceful pre-emption, you diminish the effectiveness
of your diplomatic moves. And, with the consequences of a terrorist attack
as hideous as they are--witness what just happened in Madrid--the U.S. must
be ready to pre-empt identified threats. And not at the last moment, when an
attack is imminent and more difficult to stop, but before the terrorist gets
in position to do irreparable harm.
Over the last decade we have seen large areas of the world where there is no
longer any state authority at all, an ideal environment for terrorists to
plan and train. In the early 1990s we came to realize the significance of a
"failed state." Earlier, people allowed themselves to think that, for
example, an African colony could gain its independence, be admitted to the
U.N. as a member state, and thereafter remain a sovereign state. Then came
Somalia. All government disappeared. No more sovereignty, no more state. The
same was true in Afghanistan. And who took over? Islamic extremists. They
soon made it clear that they regarded the concept of the state as an
abomination. To them, the very idea of "the state" was un-Islamic.
They
talked about reviving traditional forms of pan-Islamic rule with no place
for the state. They were fundamentally, and violently, opposed to the way
the world works, to the international state system.
The United States launched a military campaign to eliminate the Taliban and
al Qaedas rule over Afghanistan. Now we and our allies are trying to help
Afghanistan become a real state again and a viable member of the
international state system. Yet there are many other parts of the world
where state authority has collapsed or, within some states, large areas
where the states authority does not run.
Thats one area of danger: places where the state has vanished. A second
area of danger is found in places where the state has been taken over by
criminals or warlords. Saddam Hussein was one example. Kim Jong Il of North
Korea is another.
They seize control of state power and use that power to enhance their
wealth, consolidate their rule and develop their weaponry. As they do this,
and as they violate the laws and principles of the international system,
they at the same time claim its privileges and immunities, such as the
principle of non-intervention into the internal affairs of a legitimate
sovereign state. For decades these thugs have gotten away with it. And the
leading nations of the world have let them get away with it.
This is why the case of Saddam Hussein and Iraq is so significant. After
Saddam Hussein consolidated power, he started a war against one of his
neighbors, Iran, and in the course of that war he committed war crimes
including the use of chemical weapons, even against his own people.
About 10 years later he started another war against another one of his
neighbors, Kuwait. In the course of doing so he committed war crimes. He
took hostages. He launched missiles against a third and then a fourth
country in the region.
That war was unique in modern times because Saddam totally eradicated
another state, and turned it into "Province 19" of Iraq. The
aggressors in
wars might typically seize some territory, or occupy the defeated country,
or install a puppet regime; but Saddam sought to wipe out the defeated
state, to erase Kuwait from the map of the world.
That got the worlds attention. Thats why, at the U.N., the votes were
wholly in favor of a U.S.-led military operation--Desert Storm--to throw
Saddam out of Kuwait and to restore Kuwait to its place as a legitimate
state in the international system. There was virtually universal recognition
that those responsible for the international system of states could not let
a state simply be rubbed out.
When Saddam was defeated, in 1991, a cease-fire was put in place. Then the
U.N. Security Council decided that, in order to prevent him from continuing
to start wars and commit crimes against his own people, he must give up his
arsenal of "weapons of mass destruction."
Recall the way it was to work. If Saddam cooperated with U.N. inspectors and
produced his weapons and facilitated their destruction, then the cease-fire
would be transformed into a peace agreement ending the state of war between
the international system and Iraq. But if Saddam did not cooperate, and
materially breached his obligations regarding his weapons of mass
destruction, then the original U.N. Security Council authorization for the
use of "all necessary force" against Iraq--an authorization that at
the end
of Desert Storm had been suspended but not cancelled--would be reactivated
and Saddam would face another round of the U.S.-led military action against
him. Saddam agreed to this arrangement.
In the early 1990s, U.N. inspectors found plenty of materials in the
category of weapons of mass destruction and they dismantled a lot of it.
They kept on finding such weapons, but as the presence of force declined,
Saddams cooperation declined. He began to play games and to obstruct the
inspection effort.
By 1998 the situation was untenable. Saddam had made inspections impossible.
President Clinton, in February 1998, declared that Saddam would have to
comply with the U.N. resolutions or face American military force. Kofi Annan
flew to Baghdad and returned with a new promise of cooperation from Saddam.
But Saddam did not cooperate. Congress then passed the Iraq Liberation Act
by a vote of 360 to 38 in the House of Representatives; the Senate gave its
unanimous consent. Signed into law on October 31, it supported the renewed
use of force against Saddam with the objective of changing the regime. By
this time, he had openly and utterly rejected the inspections and the U.N.
resolutions.
In November 1998, the Security Council passed a resolution declaring Saddam
to be in "flagrant violation" of all resolutions going back to 1991.
That
meant that the cease-fire was terminated and the original authorization for
the use of force against Saddam was reactivated. President Clinton ordered
American forces into action in December 1998.
But the U.S. military operation was called off after only four
days--apparently because President Clinton did not feel able to lead the
country in war at a time when he was facing impeachment.
So inspections stopped. The U.S. ceased to take the lead. But the inspectors
reported that as of the end of 1998 Saddam possessed major quantities of
WMDs across a range of categories, and particularly in chemical and
biological weapons and the means of delivering them by missiles. All the
intelligence services of the world agreed on this.
From that time until late last year, Saddam was left undisturbed to do what
he wished with this arsenal of weapons. The international system had given
up its ability to monitor and deal with this threat. All through the years
between 1998 and 2002 Saddam continued to act and speak and to rule Iraq as
a rogue state.
President Bush made it clear by 2002, and against the background of 9/11,
that Saddam must be brought into compliance. It was obvious that the world
could not leave this situation as it was. The U.S. made the decision to
continue to work within the scope of the Security Council resolutions--a
long line of them--to deal with Saddam. After an extended and excruciating
diplomatic effort, the Security Council late in 2002 passed Resolution 1441,
which gave Saddam one final chance to comply or face military force. When on
December 8, 2002, Iraq produced its required report, it was clear that
Saddam was continuing to play games and to reject his obligations under
international law. His report, thousands of pages long, did not in any way
account for the remaining weapons of mass destruction that the U.N.
inspectors had reported to be in existence as of the end of 1998. That
assessment was widely agreed upon.
That should have been that. But the debate at the U.N. went on--and on. And
as it went on it deteriorated. Instead of the focus being kept on Iraq and
Saddam, France induced others to regard the problem as one of restraining
the U.S.--a position that seemed to emerge from Frances aspirations for
greater influence in Europe and elsewhere. By March of 2003 it was clear
that French diplomacy had resulted in splitting NATO, the European Union,
and the Security Council . . . and probably convincing Saddam that he would
not face the use of force. The French position, in effect, was to say that
Saddam had begun to show signs of cooperation with the U.N. resolutions
because more than 200,000 American troops were poised on Iraqs borders
ready to strike him; so the U.S. should just keep its troops poised there
for an indeterminate time to come, until presumably France would instruct us
that we could either withdraw or go into action. This of course was
impossible militarily, politically, and financially.
Where do we stand now? These key points need to be understood: